The Minister of National Defence simply refuses to recognize that the F-35 is a seriously troubled program.  That’s why US defense secretary Gates fired the general in charge in February.  And the program continues to face delays and increasing costs–please look again at these posts this week:

“Bad news for the F-35–and for Canada?”

F-35: Lockheed Martin ‘fesses up/A “wink and a nod” Update

F-35 woes: “A Shocking And Unexpected Development”/Canadian Predate

Yet now we read this pap from the minister; he could be headed for a political fall:

F-35 ‘glitches’ won’t affect Canadian fighter jet order, MacKay says

Rising costs and delays are again plaguing development of the next generation fighter aircraft that the Harper government is buying from the United States – but Canada’s Defence Minister insists this country’s F-35 jet order remains unaffected by these “glitches.”

U.S. aircraft maker Lockheed Martin’s CEO warned this week that development of the F-35s will likely take more time and money to complete…

Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Lockheed Martin has assured his department that these problems are not afflicting the basic version of the F-35 fighter that Canada has ordered…

“What our department officials are telling us – who are in direct contact with Lockheed – is that this will not affect the Canadian costs nor will it affect delivery time,” the minister said in an interview.

“We are being told that the conventional aircraft is on time and on budget.”

The Harper government has found few defenders outside of the aerospace and defence communities for a controversial decision in July to commit to buying 65 new fighter jets without a competitive bidding process. The purchase will require an initial commitment of $9-billion and an estimated $7-billion in the decades ahead for support and maintenance…

The Canadian government says the production cost of each F-35 will average $74.5-million (U.S.) – but other obligations such as spare parts, simulators, and program management costs mean that the full package works out to $138-million per jet. It also estimates the annual maintenance price tag for the jets will total $250-million, on par with the current bill for the aging CF-18 planes…

Trusting blindly in what Lockheed Martin says has not proved a sensible thing to do so far.  The minister says there are no delays for the US Air Force’s F-35A version the government is planning to get?  And the delivery date for us won’t be affected?  Our first aircraft are supposed to arrive in 2016.  So we are going to get them before they’re in full operational USAF service, since “…development of the conventional take-off and landing F-35A and carrier-based F-35C will be extended by one year to 2017.”  Sure, Peter.

As for our cost per aircraft not rising.  In 2016/17 the plane will not be at full production rate (and probably not for a while thereafter).  Costs for early production aircraft are always greater than later on as economies of scale are achieved with increased rate of build and as the construction learning curve takes effect.   There is no way, if we buy the planes in the time-frame now envisaged by the government, that we will get them at a (comparatively) cheap full-rate production cost–which is what the $74.5 million (U.S.) price per plane must represent.  And we definitely will not get them cheaper than the USAF is paying.

Long term support and maintenance of the aircraft is supposed to cost us $7 billion but “…Pentagon cost analysts now estimate the JSF may be as much as 1 1/2 times more expensive to maintain than the warplanes it will replace.”  So what will our costs really be?

The government moreover touts the gazillions of dollars Canadian companies will make from total sales of up to 5,000 planes as a major reason for our buying the F-35.  Sure.  Look at this:

A prime Canadian F-35 ostrich

And note that…

…further delays are likely to accelerate the recent trend in which international customers – including Norway, the Netherlands and the U.K. – have decided to delay commitments and orders. The new Congress may also slow U.S. acquisitions to avoid an increase in concurrency, or the overlap of production and development…

Remember that only some 4,400 F-16s have been sold, with a much broader customer base than now envisaged for the F-35.

Mr MacKay seems to be living in a dreamland. He would do well to look at this March 2010 United States Government Accountability Office report:

…
The JSF program is still recovering from earlier problems—extensive design changes, late parts deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing practices—that continue to delay aircraft deliveries. The prime contractor has restructured the manufacturing schedule three times since 2007 and a fourth revision is under way. Each revision has lengthened the time to deliver aircraft to the test program. As of December 2009, the contractor had delivered only 4 of 13 development test aircraft, 2 CTOL aircraft (including the original non-production representative model) [those two planes are now in testing] and 2 STOVL aircraft. Delivery of the first CV test aircraft is now expected in March 2010. Contractor and program officials now expect to complete delivery of all test aircraft at the end of 2010. Prior plans had expected delivery of almost all aircraft by 2009…[p. 14]

Given the ongoing engineering and manufacturing challenges, the program will have difficulty meeting its current procurement plans…[p. 20]

Steadily lengthening schedules to complete key system develop efforts further exacerbates the already extreme overlap among development, test, and production activities. Late deliveries of development test aircraft and less productivity than planned have slowed development flight testing and resulted in the program missing important milestones. The restructuring directive to add four aircraft to supplement the development flight test program, if implemented, should significantly increase test capacity and lessen concurrency with operational testing, but officials agree that flight plans are still aggressive. Other technical challenges abound, including (1) relying on an extensive but largely unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system performance, (2) continuing challenges in developing and integrating very large and complex software requirements essential to JSF capabilities, and (3) maturing several technologies that are essential to meet operational performance and logistical support requirements. Collectively, these testing and developmental challenges can be expected to lead to additional delays and increased program costs… [emphasis added, p. 22]

…Risks are manifold—mounting cost and schedule pressures; complex, extensive, and unproven software requirements; and a nascent, very aggressive test program that continues to experience significant delays. Since our last report, development costs have again increased and the schedule for completing development and operational testing has been extended. Further acquisition cost increases and delays are expected. Impacts on production are uncertain, but increased manufacturing labor hours and late deliveries of development aircraft indicate that learning curve efficiencies are not meeting expectations and will likely result in higher future procurement unit prices than those currently reported to Congress…[p. 32]

Things do not seem to be looking up much, do they?  Can’t wait for…

…the technical baseline review (TBR) that was launched by the new director of the JSF Program Office, Vice Adm. Dave Venlet. He succeeded Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, who was dismissed and has since retired. The TBR supports a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review of the program that is due on Nov. 22 [emphasis added]…

Predate: More broadly on operational requirements, starting with the Chief of the Air Staff:

Canada and the F-35: Two views…

Mark
Ottawa