1) NATO fails to deliver half of trainers promised for Afghanistan

…
A further complication is that some contributing countries, including Canada, have placed restrictions on how and where their trainers can be used in Afghanistan.

The pledge of Canadian trainers last month came with the caveat that they not be used outside the Kabul area or “outside the wire,” such as in mentoring roles that would put them in the field with Afghan soldiers or police officers.

Although the makeup of the Canadian training force has yet to be announced [the US has been pressing us], the limitation sets a domino effect into motion. To find places for them, NATO commanders will likely have to move trainers from other countries out of bases and schools in the Afghan capital…

Lots more on that wee difficulty from BruceR. at Flit.

2) Foreign troop deaths in Afghanistan top 700 in 2010: site

…
The latest figures came as The New York Times reported that senior US military commanders in Afghanistan are pushing to expand special operations ground raids across the border in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas.

But the story was denied by a spokesman for ISAF, who said there was “absolutely no truth” to any suggestion that ground operations into Pakistan were planned.

3) U.S. Military Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan

WASHINGTON — Senior American military commanders in Afghanistan are pushing for an expanded campaign of Special Operations ground raids across the border into Pakistan’s tribal areas, a risky strategy reflecting the growing frustration with Pakistan’s efforts to root out militants there.

The proposal, described by American officials in Washington and Afghanistan, would escalate military activities inside Pakistan, where the movement of American forces has been largely prohibited because of fears of provoking a backlash.

The plan has not yet been approved, but military and political leaders say a renewed sense of urgency has taken hold, as the deadline approaches for the Obama administration to begin withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan. Even with the risks, military commanders say that using American Special Operations troops could bring an intelligence windfall, if militants were captured, brought back across the border into Afghanistan and interrogated…

…one senior American officer said, “We’ve never been as close as we are now to getting the go-ahead to go across.”..

Update: From Terry Glavin:

…

…
All I’m saying here is that nothing cheers me up more than the sight of an unveiled Afghan woman cradling a machine gun [actually an AK assault rifle variant].

Mark
Ottawa

James Cudmore, who broke the story, rather bravely starts a topic thread at Milnet.ca:

We’ve just filed this story below on cbc.ca, radio and TV. More on the National tonight. It’s about JTF2 and two CFNIS investigations called Sand Trap, investigating allegations of wrongdoing in Afghanistan.  Some allegations were investigated, with no charges.   Other investigations are still ongoing. shared here, from my perspective, for conversation purposes:

There are calls for public oversight of an elite military unit amid allegations that Canadian soldiers were involved in improper killings of Afghans.

Federal politicians and a former member of the military are making the calls in light of a series of closed-door investigations in Ottawa that have been looking into the explosive claims involving the covert unit, Joint Task Force 2.

The allegations included claims that members of JTF2 witnessed American soldiers killing an unarmed man, and, in a separate incident, that a member of JTF2 killed a man who was surrendering.

Earlier this year, CBC News reported that the first probe – named Sandtrap – looked into the allegations that a Canadian was involved in the 2006 shooting death of an Afghan who had his hands up in the act of surrender. That probe ended without any charges.

Read more: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/12/01/canada-jtf2-investigation.html#ixzz16tsF4VN5

Read the reactions. An earlier post:

Afstan, special forces, and our silent government

Mark
Ottawa

Lots of cautionary intellectual nutrition at Flit.

1) Today’s essential Afghan reading

Alex Strick van Lindschoten has spent more time in Kandahar City than many Kandaharis. His opinion is always worth listening to. His “Five Things David Petraeus Wants You to Believe” is cutting:

Truth #1: “It’s Working!”
Truth #2: “The Night Raids and Targeting of the Insurgency’s Leadership is an Effective Tool.”
Truth #3: “The Military Effort is Subservient to Broader Political Goals.”
Truth #4: “Mullah Mohammad Omar is irrelevant.”
Truth #5: “Don’t mind the Afghan Government.”

Another old-time Afghan hand, Tim Lynch, is with the Marines in Sangin these days. His posts give a good sense of what COIN is supposed to look like, when it’s resourced and fully committed to.

There’s no question the Marines are probably more effective man for man than most ISAF contingents at the moment…

2) A reader comment, and an ISAF return (with a Monty Python video)

A well-placed U.S. civilian official who has served in southern Afghanistan and whose opinion I’ve come to respect offers his thoughts on a couple recent posts:

You are right on the mark on pointing out the mismatch between Canada’s desire to have all of its future training positions “behind the wire” and the actual available slots in NTM-A. I haven’t seen any media reports about this. Is DND not paying attention or are they not saying anything for fear of getting smacked down by the Privy Council Office?

On another issue, I see a lot of arrogance and even hubris connected with the U.S. surge in Kandahar. Demolishing grape huts and replacing them with a “better” design?..

BruceR’s comment…

As far as hard-knock ops, I think we need to start considering that our current way of war can actively inhibit any kind of truces or negotiated settlements. The shoe that didn’t drop with the Fake Taliban Fiasco is that if we had known enough about the real Taliban leader to confirm the impostor’s identity, odds are he’d have been JPEL’d and dead long before ["joint prioritised effects list"]. By not taking prisoners of war (we don’t, really, they almost all are let go) and engaging in targetted assassination against the equivalent of section commanders and up, we’ve already removed any realistic possibility of dialogue or reconciliation. There’s no realistic role for a third-party neutral mediator, either… no insurgent leader of any weight could reasonably expect that a trip to, say, Saudi Arabia for instance, to engage in negotiations would not result in their electronic trail leading back to the crosshairs of a Hellfire in the end…

Update: This Canadian officer certainly seems a bit rash:

Canadian colonel says Taliban defeated on battlefield

The outgoing commander of Canada’s mentoring team in Kandahar says the Taliban were routed this fall and won’t present a significant threat in the future.

Col. Ian Creighton says the lull in violence that’s trickled across southern Afghanistan over the past few weeks has nothing to do with onset of colder weather, as in previous years.

He says the Taliban were defeated on the battlefield.

The blatantly upbeat assessment is at odds with American officers at NATO’s southern Afghan command, who last week said it will be the spring before they can be sure the recent offensive through the Taliban heartland was successful.

Creighton, whose soldiers teach and fight alongside Afghans [that's the type of training we're going to stop doing in 2011], says militants that managed to flee will find NATO and Afghan forces holding their ground and will run into a “brick wall” if they try to return…

One can hope.  Meanwhile, further to this post on the US Marines sending tanks to Afstan,

Where Canada and Denmark led…

the conclusion of a challenging article by a US Army officer:

Tanks, But No Tanks
Why heavy armor won’t save Afghanistan.
…
It may be counterintuitive, but we actually need less armor, and we need to be more flexible and unpredictable. Instead of dictating that no unit can leave its base unless in an MRAP [our Army has them too] or MATV, we must allow them to use Humvees, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and ruggedized pickup trucks when appropriate. Knowing their movements are being watched at all times, units need to use deception, such as varying the time of day and night they move, their routes of travel, and the types of vehicles in which they conduct missions, to keep the insurgents constantly guessing. Insurgents cannot possibly booby-trap and watch every road, trail, and wadi in Afghanistan but they can and do hammer us on the few roads that will support armored vehicles.

This is a very unconventional war being waged in the most difficult terrain possible, and we are responding very conventionally. Instead of allowing such ingenuity and its associated risk, the coalition’s default response has been to add more armor and widgets to ever larger vehicles that are the very antithesis of basic counterinsurgency operations.

We may not be able to “defeat” the IED, but we can make it irrelevant. To do so will require us to rely upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the junior leaders who are most in tune with the local dynamics and terrain, not on technology or defensive-minded mandates designed to prevent casualties at all costs. Marginalizing the IED will also require higher commanders to accept greater risk and allow their subordinates to sometimes make mistakes — even deadly ones. But that’s the only way to start connecting with the Afghan people, who are the ones who will defeat the Taliban in the end. It’s time to start playing to win instead of trying to avoid losing.

Maj. Michael Waltz served as the director for Afghanistan in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and as an advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney on South Asia and counterterrorism. He currently commands a U.S. Army Special Forces unit in the reserve component that recently returned from Afghanistan.

I cannot imagine a Canadian officer writing so bluntly in our media.

Mark
Ottawa

Excerpts from an important post at Tom Ricks’ The Best Defense blog:

Ignatius, Kaplan, and Klein just don’t get it: Petraeus is changing the Afghan war’s intensity, not its overall strategy

Here is a comment from Paula Broadwell, who is just your typical Army Reserve officer who is doing a PhD and writing a biography of General Petraeus on the side…

…Since Petraeus has arrived in Afghanistan, he has increased the intensity of every element of a comprehensive civil-military COIN campaign, not just the so-called CT element. After my trip to Afghanistan last month, during which I visited at the battalion, division, and ISAF headquarters levels, it is clear to me that the “shift” is not one of focus, but of energy and increased intensity across all lines of the counterinsurgency effort. The Kaplan, Ignatius and Klein observations are based loosely on a recent increase in both air strikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) targeted killing — and they are certainly right about that. But take a deep breath, guys: CT operations have always been a key part of the kinetic component of COIN. In his speeches, articles, and doctrine over the past nine years, Petraeus has always been clear on this point. It was evident during his command in Iraq, and is equally so now in Afghanistan…

…killing and capturing are not the only component of the kinetic line. From July to late September, ISAF SOF forces also conducted 1,823 population-centric non-kinetic operations. Petraeus’s comprehensive COIN strategy clearly states that these CT and population-centric operations must be complemented by clear/hold/build operations of conventional forces, training of host nation elements, and local security initiatives. This comprehensive approach is a mantra Petraeus continues to push on his battlefield circulations and in his morning update briefs to field commanders. And ISAF troops appear to be doing it, though some would clearly prefer a steadier diet of kinetics…

One potential capacity building “game changer,” adopted this summer under President Hamid Karzai with Petraeus’s “relentless prodding,” is the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative. The long-term impact of this program remains to be seen, but early reviews seem encouraging as it moves toward a goal of 20,000 recruits. Along with the Village Stability Operations, Petraeus has pushed hard to promote the ALP. The ALP program, for which there are 68 sites identified in eastern and central Afghanistan, now has around 250-350 police located at each site. Run by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and mentored by U.S. Special Forces teams, the ALP have already helped with the disruption of insurgency IED networks. The ALP has yet to hit a tipping point, but it is an important component of the stabilization and transition plans that didn’t gain traction under previous ISAF commanders…

These efforts have been complemented by an accelerated political line of effort that include reconciliation, reintegration, governance, and — under Brig. H.R. McMaster — a focus on inclusivity, transparency, and anti-corruption. One initiative where Petraeus has focused immense attention and effort, for example, is a focus on fixing COIN contracting. As Petraeus’s new October COIN Contracting Guidance says, “With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support collective Afghan and ISAF objectives. But by spending large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, some of those funds have unintentionally fueled corruption, financed insurgent organizations, strengthened criminal patronage networks, and undermined our efforts in Afghanistan.” Petraeus made anti-corruption efforts “commander’s business” and has focused equal attention on this aspect of the campaign as he has the CT effort. Now, in partnership with Karzai, he’s trying to hold contractors accountable. It’s a task that has defeated most everyone who has taken on corruption in Afghanistan, but Petraeus remains determined to make progress.

Petraeus has also placed increased emphasis on reconciliation and reintegration efforts in his first four months…

Paula Broadwell, a West Point graduate, is the author of the forthcoming book, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus (Penguin Press, 2011). The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or Derek Jeter.

Earlier:

Could the US actually be starting to win in Afstan?/Canadian angle Upperdate

Mark
Ottawa

Your UAV fix for today, and other things:

Drones Target Terror Plot
CIA Strikes Intensify in Pakistan Amid Heightened Threats in Europe [see also "shocker" below]

C.I.A. Steps Up Drone Attacks in Pakistan to Thwart Taliban

Pakistani government condemns NATO airstrikes

Petraeus Says Taliban Have Reached Out to Karzai

I wonder if the “shocker” related in this post might just have a connection to the first headline above:

Afstan: Just say “no” to NATO/CIA Great Gaming, Canadian terrorist “shocker” Update/US AfPak docs Upperdate

Update: More from Paul at Celestial Junk on the reaping:

Predators Gone Wild

Obama is getting one thing right as he allows the predator and air war to expand…

Grim?

…

STAFF SGT. BRIAN FERGUSON / AIR FORCE
An MQ-9 Reaper taxis down a runway in Afghanistan…

Earlier:

Drone porn?

And see the Update thought here.  Canadian UAVs in Afstan are, of course, not weaponized; imagine the shock, the horror, the uproar if one of our “drones” accidentally killed one civilian, eh?

Mark
Ottawa

Fading soon:

British Cuts to Military Concern U.S. Officials
…
A wrenching government spending review has pitted Britain’s army against its navy, spawned a series of leaks to the British media and raised the question of whether the military that emerges from the budget cuts — expected to be 10 percent to 20 percent of current outlays — will be a strategically agile force that can join the United States on major combat operations…

With other European nations embarking on substantial military spending retrenchments, and the Obama administration committed to acting in concert with allies whenever possible, the British spending review has received high-level attention in Washington, including in a meeting on Wednesday between Liam Fox, the British defense minister, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Mr. Fox told reporters later that, after any cuts, the British military would be able to respond to a broad array of threats and retain capabilities particularly valued by the Pentagon. He identified those as Britain’s Special Forces [see below for more], its nuclear deterrent, its participation in the Joint Strike Fighter program [good news for our government--but note this: "Mr Fox is resigned to axing at least half the planned order of US F-35 aircraft to fly off the ships. But if Britain buys only 70 or fewer..."] and its ability to deploy substantial forces when needed…

Still, the entire active-duty British armed forces are smaller than the United States Marine Corps [emphasis added, USMC just over 200,000], and some critics at home have charged that the review is little more than a budgetary drill dressed up as a broader assessment of military requirements…

“There is no way that the U.K., in the current financial climate, will be able to maintain a permanent at-sea, submarine-based nuclear deterrent, the size of fast jet fleet that we currently have, the ambition for a two-aircraft carrier strike program and an army of 100,000,” said Richard Dannatt, the former head of the British Army…

More:

Britain tells US ‘we cannot fight another Afghanistan’

Lots more on British budget woes at this Milnet.ca topic thread. And a mildly related post on the Canadian military:

The Canadian Forces, war present, and future?

As for Afstan, an odd silence that is shared by our government:

We may be beating the Taliban, but in this country you’d never know it
Why does the Government insist on playing down the successes of our Forces, asks Con Coughlin.

Every evening in Afghanistan, small, heavily armed units of SAS soldiers are taking part in “kill or capture” missions against the Taliban. The majority of the raids – which are guided by the latest intelligence reports provided to Nato headquarters in Kabul – are targeted directly at senior Taliban commanders, those responsible for planting the deadly roadside bombs that have accounted for so many British casualties.

The SAS raids are part of a special forces operation on an “industrial scale”, devised by General David Petraeus, the US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, to destroy the Taliban’s war-fighting capability. And the strategy is proving to be a resounding success.

Over a 90-day period this summer, 365 key Taliban commanders were either killed or captured in a total of 3,000 night raids carried out by British and American special forces units, operating predominantly in southern Afghanistan. Another 1,031 “rank and file” fighters were killed, and 1,355 taken into custody.

Not surprisingly, this unprecedented level of special forces activity is having a devastating impact on the Taliban’s effectiveness and morale. British commanders have reported a significant drop in their casualty rates, while the number of roadside bombs has fallen by a quarter.

…the overwhelming majority of the British public appears to be totally unaware of these highly significant developments.

…Part of the answer lies in the strange reluctance of senior British officers to provide details of the scale of the carnage that is daily being inflicted on the Taliban. Normally, governments are only too eager to proclaim the military’s successes in times of war, not least because of their propaganda value. Churchill sustained morale during the darkest hours of the Second World War with constant updates on enemy losses, while Thatcher was unequivocal in her praise of British victories in the Falklands.

Those responsible for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, by contrast, fall silent when asked to provide details of enemy losses. The explanation, or so I was told by one Cabinet minister, is a concern that publishing details of Taliban deaths would play into the hands of anti-war campaigners, who would exploit the information for their own propaganda purposes. Politicians are also mindful of the impact the true level of Taliban casualties might have on British Muslims. There are already significant numbers who actively support the Taliban and its allies, and ministers have convinced themselves that the total would only grow if the movement’s true plight were more widely known.

This policy of restraint, however, is self-defeating, because public support is crucial to the ultimate success of any military campaign…

Our government, for its part, has been totally silent on what our special forces are achieving in Afstan. The government certainly is sqeamish about saying what they actually do; same fear of adverse reaction, one supposes.

Update factoid: At least the Canadian Forces, with some 68,000 regulars (but not growing, scroll down here to Table: Human Resources), are over 50% larger than the US Coast Guard’s 42,000 active duty personnel.  On the other hand the Canadian Navy is around 9,000 strong.

Mark
Ottawa

Earlier and related:

Prime ministerial (and presidential) priorities

Afstan, special forces, and our silent government

Now:

Canada’s shadow war ends when troops leave Kandahar in 2011, overseas commander

The shadow war fought in Afghanistan by Canada’s ultra-secret, special forces will also end next year when the army ceases combat operations in Kandahar, says the general in charge of the country’s overseas command.

It is a significant, if somewhat unrecognized, milestone for a force whose exploits have been blanketed in secrecy for almost a decade…

Lt.-Gen. Marc Lessard, the head of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, said it’s often not recognized the parliamentary motion to halt combat operations by July 2011 also applies to the special forces, who were the first to hit the ground in Afghanistan following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

“The special forces are an entity of the Canadian Forces (and) the direction from the whole of government applies to the special forces,” Lessard said in an interview this week with The Canadian Press. “Absolutely, it applies to every, every element.”

How many special forces soldiers are in Afghanistan is classified, but they are thought to number in the hundreds

There are some in military circles who’d expected Canada to quietly maintain a token contingent of commandos on a rotational basis, even with the withdrawal of regular troops, but Lessard said there is no plan to leave any forces behind.

“There’s absolutely no planning, and I can tell you because I’m the one doing it, for any type of residual force — or any type of new mission; there’s no planning at all,” said Lessard, who spent the better part of 2008 as commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan.

He said Gen. Walter Natynczyk, the defence chief, has given clear orders: ”We’re not to engage in any planning whatsoever.”

The directive is all-encompassing. Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under Access to Information show that even the staff officers at NATO’s field headquarters in Kabul will be withdrawn, along with the combat troops and special forces.

“Staff and headquarters positions for which the CF is currently responsible will not cease in July 2011 but be maintained, but not beyond December 2011,” said a Dec. 9, 2009 warning order from Lessard…

Mark
Ottawa

From Paul at Celestial Junk:

…

I’d love to give a report on how Canada’s CSOR is doing in Afghanistan, but can’t. Something to do with our PMOs spineless need to inflict PC, Karzai ass-kissing, and red tape to our door-kickers … so while they sit around in Kandahar for 6 month stints waiting for permission and assets to act on intelligence reports, the yanks step in and get the job done ASAP. I guess that’s what happens when economists and political hacks run a war effort

Background:

Canadian Special Operations Regiment

…

Our goverment is effectively silent about our special forces in Afstan–unlike the Aussies who trumpet their SOF’s work, see here and here. And from their Department of Defence “Fact Sheet“:

…
Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) – A Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) is deployed to Oruzgan and is focused on conducting population-centric operations. The Task Group works with the Dutch led Task-Force Uruzgan [needs updating, now its the Americans] and provides a level of enhanced force protection to ADF MTF-1 activities in the province.

Australia’s Special Forces commitment is structured to ensure that pressure is maintained against Taliban extremists throughout Afghanistan’s harsh winters.

The SOTG consists of Commandos, members of the Special Air Service Regiment and enabling and support personnel…

Now see if you can find any mention of CF special forces at their Afstan fact sheet. And can you imagine our government permitting the CF to put out news releases highlighting our role in targeted killings of Talibs? Not something delicate Canadian sensitivities can cope with, I guess.

By the way, the Aussies even permit photos (guess what these fellows are doing):

Soldiers from the Special Operations Task Group provide over watch during a counter insurgency operation.
Nov 5, 2009…

Mark
Ottawa

We’re lacking the latter (so far).  A post by Damian at SDA:

Deeds, Not Words

More on JTF 2

Update: The Aussies are not shy about their special forces’ activities in Afstan–see here and here.

Mark
Ottawa