This at first glance looks like non-governmental intelligence of a pretty high order:

Executive Summary
The Battle for Afghanistan
Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar

By Anand Gopal
November 9, 2010 | New America Foundation [right click "new window" to enlarge map]

Go to ‘Battle for Afghanistan’ home

As Afghanistan’s cultural and political heartland, Kandahar is a province of key strategic importance for foreign forces, the Afghan government, and the insurgency. A sizable chunk of the Taliban’s senior leadership hails from the province, and the cultural and political dynamics of rural Kandahar shape aspects of the movement’s character to this day.

This study attempts to understand the Taliban of Kandahar by looking at the factors that spurred their rise and the networks and structures through which they operate. The findings include:

• The Taliban’s resurgence in Kandahar post-2001 was not inevitable or preordained. The Taliban—from senior leadership levels down to the rank and file—by and large surrendered to the new government and retired to their homes. But in the early years after 2001, there was a lack of a genuine, broad-based reconciliation process in which the Taliban leadership would be allowed to surrender in exchange for amnesty and protection from persecution. Rather, foreign forces and their proxies pursued an unrelenting drive against former regime members, driving many of them to flee to Pakistan and launch an insurgency.
• Once the Taliban leadership decided to stand against the Afghan government and its foreign backers, they were able to take advantage of growing disillusionment in the countryside. In particular, the dominance of one particular set of tribes caused members of other, marginalized tribes to look to the insurgency as a source of protection and access to resources. The weakness of the judiciary and police forced many to turn to the Taliban’s provision of law and order, while widespread torture and abuse at the hands of pro-government strongmen eroded government support. At the same time, the heavy-handed tactics of U.S. forces turned many against the foreign presence.
• Despite popular belief, the Taliban in Kandahar cannot easily be divided into an “ideological core” and rank-and-file fighters motivated mainly by material concerns. After 2001, most senior Taliban leaders in the province had accepted the new government, or at least rejected it but declined to fight against it. Most did not invoke the notion of jihad as an immediate reaction to the new government. Rather, only after a protracted campaign against former Taliban did many of them feel they had no place in the new state of affairs and began to see the presence of the government and foreign fighters as necessitating jihad. And after the emergence of the insurgency, there were a number of attempts by senior leaders to come to terms with the Afghan government, yet at the same time there were very few attempts to do so by rank-and-file field commanders.
• The Taliban have developed an intricate shadow government apparatus. At the top is the shadow governor, who works closely with a body called the Military Commission. In theory, the governor directs strategy, coordinates with leadership in Pakistan, and liaises with other actors in the province, while the Military Commission adjudicates disputes and serves in an advisory role. There is also a detailed district-level apparatus, including shadow district governors and, in some districts police chiefs and district shuras.
• Parallel to this formal structure are numerous informal networks through which the Taliban make decisions and propagate influence. Although there are detailed mechanisms in place, involving the provincial shadow apparatus, to deal with battlefield strategy or intra-Taliban disputes, many times strategic decisions or punitive actions are taken through informal means. These include cases where senior leaders in Pakistan direct operations through their network of commanders in Kandahar.
• Contrary to popular perception, the Taliban in Kandahar do not appear to receive regular salaries. Rather, each commander is responsible for raising funds for his group, which is typically done through capturing spoils in operations or collecting (sometimes forcefully) local taxes. Some funding also comes from external sources, such as merchants in Pakistan and wealthy donors in the Persian Gulf states.
• In addition to winning support from marginalized communities and offering law and order, the Taliban were able to gain influence through severe intimidation and widespread human rights abuses. Moreover, a brutal assassination campaign against anyone even remotely connected to the government—tribal elders, government officials, aid workers, religious clerics, and others—succeeded in widening the gap between the local communities and the government.
• The Taliban’s rise in Kandahar after 2001 can be divided into four periods. From 2001 to 2004, the group was involved in reorganizing itself, resuscitating old networks, and forging new connections. Between 2004 and 2006, the burgeoning movement was focused on consolidating itself, while winning rank-and-file recruits outside those who had worked with the Taliban in the 1990s; it began to amass members in large numbers. A turning point came in the western part of the province in 2006, when the Taliban suffered a major battlefield loss against foreign forces in Operation Medusa [emphasis added, most of those forces were Canadian]. This was one factor that spurred the next phase, asymmetric warfare, between 2006 and 2009. These years were marked by the increased use of suicide bombings and roadside attacks. The year 2010 marks a new phase in the struggle. While the insurgents are still relying heavily on suicide attacks and roadside bombs, foreign troops are giving unprecedented attention to the province, and violence has escalated to levels not previously seen in this war.

For the full text of this 44-page report, please click here.

Anand Gopal is an Afghanistan-based journalist. He is the coauthor of the New America Foundation’s “Battle For Pakistan” paper on militancy and conflict in North Waziristan.

Mark
Ottawa

Well, well, well:

White House moves away from 2011 Afghanistan withdrawal timeline
The Obama administration is walking away from what it once touted as key deadlines in the Afghanistan war in an effort to de-emphasize the president’s pledge that he would begin withdrawing U.S. forces in July 2011.

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration has decided to walk away from what it once touted as key deadlines in the Afghanistan war in an effort to de-emphasize the president’s pledge that he would begin withdrawing U.S. forces in July 2011, administration and military officials said Tuesday.

The new policy will be on display next week during a NATO conference in Lisbon, Portugal, where the administration hopes to introduce a timeline that calls for the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014, according to three senior officials and others speaking anonymously as a matter of policy. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said Afghan troops could provide their security by then.

The Pentagon also has decided not to announce specific dates for handing security responsibility for several Afghan provinces to local officials and instead intends to work out a more vague definition of transition when it meets with its NATO allies, the officials said.

What a year ago had been touted as an extensive December review of the strategy now will be less expansive and will offer no major changes in strategy, the officials said. U.S. Central Command, the military division that oversees Afghanistan operations, hasn’t submitted a withdrawal order for forces for the July deadline [emphasis added], two of those officials said.

The shift, begun privately, came in part because U.S. officials realized that conditions in Afghanistan were unlikely to allow a speedy withdrawal…

This change of course obviously put the US in a much better position to pressure on us to keep troops in Afstan.  Meanwhile back home, the Crvena Zvezda’s prime pundit is desperate ideed for Canada to cut and run (number 2 pundit, Doubting Thomas Walkom, is equally ignorant; he too just does not understand anything about how military training is done–see Update below):

The Star’s Travesty Weighs In

For a very good overview of our role, take a look at this new background paper from the Library of Parliament:

Canadian Policy Towards Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: Issues, Prospects, Options

Update: Why CF trainers at Kabul would be a very Good Thing:

…
Total ANSF growth, starting from November 2009 to present increased from 191,969 to 255,506, an increase of 63,537 (33 percent). The Afghan army has grown from 97,011 to 136,164, an increase of 39,153 (40 percent) and the national police from 94,958 to 117,342, an increase of 22,384 (24 percent).

In November 2009, only 35 percent of all soldiers met the minimum qualification standards with their personal weapon. There was an unworkable 1:79 trainers to troop ratio at the firing ranges where Afghan soldiers were attempting to learn. Ten months later, the average unit has a 97 percent qualification rate at the range and the instructor to troop ratio has decreased to 1:29, thanks to increasing support from coalition partners.

The quality of the troops may in some way be reflected through public trust. The Afghan Minister of Defense, Abdul Rahim Wardak, mentioned that the Afghan National Police (ANA) is perceived as the most trusted public institution in Afghanistan during a Rehearsal of Concept drill in Kabul in October. According to the results of an Afghan nation-wide survey (sample 6,700), 71 percent of Afghans feel a favorable impression toward the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 74 percent feel favorably towards the ANA. (By comparison, only 23 percent of Americans surveyed in a Gallup poll this month felt favorably towards the U.S. Congress.)

Last fall, the daily ISAF training capacity for the ANA was 6,000 seats, resulting in a backlog of the Afghan troops in the pipeline. Today, the ANA daily training capacity has increased to 20,000 seats (up 233 percent) and the ANP training capacity has increased 38 percent, from 7,740 to 10,661 seats. In 2009, there were zero Afghan trainers. Today, there are 1,800 Afghan trainers in the ANA and 800 in the ANP, and those numbers are growing. A critical assumption here is the continued support of coalition trainers [emphasis added]…

Education of this force is also critical to professionalization, but it takes time as we can see in western professional development pipelines for NCOs and officers. NTM-A has developed a “backbone” of NCOs, from 1,950 to 9,300, an increase of 7,350 (376 percent). The National Military Academy of Afghanistan had 300 applicants in 2005 for 120 spaces, and 3600 applicants this year for 600 spaces…

Hopefully, the upcoming Lisbon Summit will allow some time for COIN math homework. While they’re balancing equations on the chalkboard, attendees there should be sure to note that while the surge of ISAF forces are on the offensive in Kandahar, there is also another important silent surge occurring in the country. Attendees will also hopefully realize that coalition forces must meet their promised trainer contributions [emphasis added] for the conditions-based transition process to work and the ANSF to ultimately receive a passing grade on its report card.

Paula Broadwell is a Research Associate at the Harvard University Center for Public Leadership. She is the author of the forthcoming book, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus (Penguin Press, 2011).

Mark
Ottawa

What the heck did the Globe and Mail’s Paul Koring expect?  A couple of riveting pages on Canada/US border issues?  My word but we are self-obsessed and need to grow up.  If one checks the index of the memoirs of almost any senior American or British political figure “Canada” will not take up a lot space.  Trust me.  We are just not that important, or interesting, to anyone except ourselves:

Canada almost nowhere in Bush memoir

And the Québécois, for their part, couldn’t give a hoot about what goes on in the RoC.

Mr Koring’s mining of the former president’s book does however bring to the surface a wickedly witty side of Prime Minister Harper to which we have not been hitherto, er, exposed:

…On his visit to Camp David, I introduced Putin to our Scottish terrier, Barney. He wasn’t very impressed. On my next visit to Russia, Vladimir asked if I wanted to meet his dog, Koni. Sure, I said. As we walked the birch-lined grounds of his dacha, a big black Labrador came charging across the lawn. With a twinkle in his eye, Vladimir said, ‘Bigger, stronger and faster than Barney.’ I later told the story to my friend, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada. ‘You’re lucky he only showed you his dog,’ he replied.”..

Mark
Ottawa

Two opinion pieces to suggest the complexities, starting with a typical piece of Pak paranoid fear-mongering and then an American perspective:

Indian boots in Afghanistan? [via Moby Media Updates]

Our Indian problem in Afghanistan

Now the latest news on how President Obama is walking the tightrope:

Obama supports adding India as a permanent member of U.N. Security Council [Paks will hate that]
…
Earlier Monday, Obama pledged to strengthen U.S.-India efforts to fight and prevent terrorism and to work with all South Asian nations to deny safe havens to terrorists.

But at a joint news conference with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Obama steered clear of the contentious issue of trying to mediate long-standing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

Obama said the United States “cannot impose a solution” between India and Pakistan. He said his country is “happy to play any role the parties think is appropriate” but added that the two neighbors will have to “find mechanisms to work out these very difficult issues.”

These were heartening words for Indian officials, who want the United States to play a role in curbing the activities of Islamic militant groups in Pakistan but at the same time stay out of facilitating a resolution over Kashmir [the Indians have been far from nice guys in Kashmir, but most of the Muslim world expresses little outrage--whilst the West basically averts its gaze in pursuit of self-interest in India]…

Singh said during the news conference that dialogue with Pakistan cannot succeed as long as Pakistani groups continue to stage terrorist attacks in India.

“You cannot simultaneously be talking and at the same time the terror machine is as active as before,” Singh said. “Once Pakistan moves away from this terror-induced coercion, we will be very happy to engage productively with Pakistan and resolve all outstanding issues.”..

More on Pak paranoia from Terry Glavin:

Who’s To Blame For Pakistan’s Agonies? ‘Hindu Zionists and American Think-Tanks.’

And an earlier article on Indian great-gaming:

India’s Tripartite Plan for Afghanistan
Delhi is drawing closer to Iran and Russia in anticipation of a U.S. troop drawdown.

Complicated neck of woods, what?  A final, really scary, note:

How a nuclear war may begin

Update thought: Quite a few Paks probably fear the presence in Afstan of a few hundred members of the Indo Tibetan Border Police to provide security for Indian interests as the thin edge of the military wedge.

Mark
Ottawa

Further to this post,

Afstan: So maybe the government will keep some CF after all

a very useful round-up from Norman Spector:

…
Though the PMO leaks presented this new training mission as an option being considered, the Defense Editor of the Times of London, Michael Evans, was already reporting it on Monday as a fait accompli (behind the paper’s pay-wall): “At the NATO summit on November 19 alliance countries may have to agree to retain some troops for a training role right up to 2014. The Netherlands has already withdrawn its troops but there will be pressure on the Dutch to send trainers. Canada, whose combat troops are to leave next year, will also be expected to commit to the training mission.”

Over at the Washington Post, on the other hand, no decision has yet been taken but the pressure on Canada was said to be intense:

“The United States, France and Britain have said to the Canadians ‘Don’t waste your experience’ in Afghanistan” by leaving before the mission is completed, said the European official, one of several who discussed the private meetings on condition of anonymity.

“If the Canadians agree,” he said, “maybe the Dutch will come back with trainers.” ..[more on the Dutch here]

Also on Monday, according to a report behind the pay-wall of the Wall Street Journal, NATO will release a report showing that “Significant progress has been made in building up the Afghan security forces, but continuing attrition among police officers and a dearth of midlevel military leaders pose major challenges … Enthusiasm within NATO for long-term mentoring of Afghan security forces appears to be eroding, and military leaders hope to persuade alliance leaders to continue their training commitment….According to the report, NATO needs 900 more trainers to build up such specialized training.”

Interestingly, the Wall Street Journal’s sister publication, the Times of London, is also reporting this behind its pay-wall:

The U.S. commander in Afghanistan has drawn up a colour-coded timetable to hand back control to local security forces, The Times has learnt.

A handful of areas in Afghanistan have been stamped “green”, signalling that they have been earmarked for a handover in the spring. The plan, which was drawn up by General David Petraeus, is to be presented to NATO leaders at the summit of alliance leaders in Lisbon on November 19.

The colours range from green to grey, the latter being the most problematic, indicating that the handover is more than two years away. Provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan in the south, and Kunar in the east, fall into this category. … The plan, which is expected to be given full support at the summit, will allow President Obama to fulfil his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan from July next year.

Most of the U.S. combat troops are in areas where there is continuous confrontation with the Taleban and other insurgents. None of the U.S. Marines in Helmand will be going home next July. They, and the British troops in Helmand, expect to be part of the campaign for another three or four years.

In today’s National Post, Senator Pamela Wallin writes:

The man who has twice commanded Canadian troops in Afghanistan says the war is “winnable.” He should know – he’s recently back from the heat of combat where he saw the combined effect of the NATO-U. S. troop surge and a more able Afghan Army. … General Vance’s optimism echoes that of Canada’s current commander on the ground in Afghanistan, Brigadier-General Dean Milner, and General David Petraeus, the top NATO commander there, who has said that operations are proceeding “more rapidly than was anticipated.” The Canadian Forces’ unique combination of warrior and humanitarian skills is also bringing – and keeping – Afghans onside. General Vance says that as a population becomes hopeful, it has a “galvanizing effect.”

In Washington, however, the New York Times reports considerable skepticism and an “intense debate” concerning reports by the military of progress in Afghanistan:

In Kandahar, NATO officials say that American and Afghan forces continue to rout the Taliban. In new statistics offered by American commanders in Kabul, Special Operations units have killed 339 midlevel Taliban commanders and 949 of the group’s foot soldiers in the past three months alone. At the Pentagon, the draft of a war assessment to be submitted to Congress this month cites a shift in momentum in some areas of the country away from the insurgency.

But as a new White House review of President Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan gets under way, the rosy signs have opened an intense debate at the Defense Department, the White House, the State Department and the intelligence agencies over what they really mean…

Even the Danes have been pushing us–and with some considerable justification as John Ivison notes at the National Post’s “Full Comment”:

…
The apparent change of heart by the Harper government came after Gitte Lillelund Bech, the Danish Defence Minister, visited Ottawa last week and met with Mr. MacKay…

Ms. Bech said she believed that Canada will commit to keeping troops in Afghanistan. “My impression from meeting him [MacKay], is that he agrees we share the same values and are fighting to eliminate safe havens for terrorism. The goals haven’t changed but I fully understand you have to have a majority in Parliament supporting what you’re doing.”

The Danes have suffered 38 casualties in Afghanistan — more, as a proportion of the country’s population, than any other contributor to ISAF [emphasis added, more here]. Yet there is no debate in Denmark about pulling troops out of the country, ahead of the 2014 deadline envisaged by the Kabul Conference.

Ms. Bech said that her government has already committed to training police officers and the military after that date.

“We will be there [Afghanistan] until the end,” she said.

Have you seen one blinking thing about the Danes and their casualties (they are fighting with the Brits in Helmand) in our self-obsessed major media? No wonder most Canadian effectively know nothing about the war other than dead Canadian soldiers, ramp ceremonies, and the Highway of Heroes.

By the way, I imagine most CF trainers in a continuing mission would be attached to the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan at Kabul.

Update: One example of the sort of non-combat training we could provide is at the ANA staff college, see this post from Kabul (with photos) by the estimable Brian Platt at his trip blog for the Ubyssey.

Mark
Ottawa

The Minister of National Defence simply refuses to recognize that the F-35 is a seriously troubled program.  That’s why US defense secretary Gates fired the general in charge in February.  And the program continues to face delays and increasing costs–please look again at these posts this week:

“Bad news for the F-35–and for Canada?”

F-35: Lockheed Martin ‘fesses up/A “wink and a nod” Update

F-35 woes: “A Shocking And Unexpected Development”/Canadian Predate

Yet now we read this pap from the minister; he could be headed for a political fall:

F-35 ‘glitches’ won’t affect Canadian fighter jet order, MacKay says

Rising costs and delays are again plaguing development of the next generation fighter aircraft that the Harper government is buying from the United States – but Canada’s Defence Minister insists this country’s F-35 jet order remains unaffected by these “glitches.”

U.S. aircraft maker Lockheed Martin’s CEO warned this week that development of the F-35s will likely take more time and money to complete…

Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Lockheed Martin has assured his department that these problems are not afflicting the basic version of the F-35 fighter that Canada has ordered…

“What our department officials are telling us – who are in direct contact with Lockheed – is that this will not affect the Canadian costs nor will it affect delivery time,” the minister said in an interview.

“We are being told that the conventional aircraft is on time and on budget.”

The Harper government has found few defenders outside of the aerospace and defence communities for a controversial decision in July to commit to buying 65 new fighter jets without a competitive bidding process. The purchase will require an initial commitment of $9-billion and an estimated $7-billion in the decades ahead for support and maintenance…

The Canadian government says the production cost of each F-35 will average $74.5-million (U.S.) – but other obligations such as spare parts, simulators, and program management costs mean that the full package works out to $138-million per jet. It also estimates the annual maintenance price tag for the jets will total $250-million, on par with the current bill for the aging CF-18 planes…

Trusting blindly in what Lockheed Martin says has not proved a sensible thing to do so far.  The minister says there are no delays for the US Air Force’s F-35A version the government is planning to get?  And the delivery date for us won’t be affected?  Our first aircraft are supposed to arrive in 2016.  So we are going to get them before they’re in full operational USAF service, since “…development of the conventional take-off and landing F-35A and carrier-based F-35C will be extended by one year to 2017.”  Sure, Peter.

As for our cost per aircraft not rising.  In 2016/17 the plane will not be at full production rate (and probably not for a while thereafter).  Costs for early production aircraft are always greater than later on as economies of scale are achieved with increased rate of build and as the construction learning curve takes effect.   There is no way, if we buy the planes in the time-frame now envisaged by the government, that we will get them at a (comparatively) cheap full-rate production cost–which is what the $74.5 million (U.S.) price per plane must represent.  And we definitely will not get them cheaper than the USAF is paying.

Long term support and maintenance of the aircraft is supposed to cost us $7 billion but “…Pentagon cost analysts now estimate the JSF may be as much as 1 1/2 times more expensive to maintain than the warplanes it will replace.”  So what will our costs really be?

The government moreover touts the gazillions of dollars Canadian companies will make from total sales of up to 5,000 planes as a major reason for our buying the F-35.  Sure.  Look at this:

A prime Canadian F-35 ostrich

And note that…

…further delays are likely to accelerate the recent trend in which international customers – including Norway, the Netherlands and the U.K. – have decided to delay commitments and orders. The new Congress may also slow U.S. acquisitions to avoid an increase in concurrency, or the overlap of production and development…

Remember that only some 4,400 F-16s have been sold, with a much broader customer base than now envisaged for the F-35.

Mr MacKay seems to be living in a dreamland. He would do well to look at this March 2010 United States Government Accountability Office report:

…
The JSF program is still recovering from earlier problems—extensive design changes, late parts deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing practices—that continue to delay aircraft deliveries. The prime contractor has restructured the manufacturing schedule three times since 2007 and a fourth revision is under way. Each revision has lengthened the time to deliver aircraft to the test program. As of December 2009, the contractor had delivered only 4 of 13 development test aircraft, 2 CTOL aircraft (including the original non-production representative model) [those two planes are now in testing] and 2 STOVL aircraft. Delivery of the first CV test aircraft is now expected in March 2010. Contractor and program officials now expect to complete delivery of all test aircraft at the end of 2010. Prior plans had expected delivery of almost all aircraft by 2009…[p. 14]

Given the ongoing engineering and manufacturing challenges, the program will have difficulty meeting its current procurement plans…[p. 20]

Steadily lengthening schedules to complete key system develop efforts further exacerbates the already extreme overlap among development, test, and production activities. Late deliveries of development test aircraft and less productivity than planned have slowed development flight testing and resulted in the program missing important milestones. The restructuring directive to add four aircraft to supplement the development flight test program, if implemented, should significantly increase test capacity and lessen concurrency with operational testing, but officials agree that flight plans are still aggressive. Other technical challenges abound, including (1) relying on an extensive but largely unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system performance, (2) continuing challenges in developing and integrating very large and complex software requirements essential to JSF capabilities, and (3) maturing several technologies that are essential to meet operational performance and logistical support requirements. Collectively, these testing and developmental challenges can be expected to lead to additional delays and increased program costs… [emphasis added, p. 22]

…Risks are manifold—mounting cost and schedule pressures; complex, extensive, and unproven software requirements; and a nascent, very aggressive test program that continues to experience significant delays. Since our last report, development costs have again increased and the schedule for completing development and operational testing has been extended. Further acquisition cost increases and delays are expected. Impacts on production are uncertain, but increased manufacturing labor hours and late deliveries of development aircraft indicate that learning curve efficiencies are not meeting expectations and will likely result in higher future procurement unit prices than those currently reported to Congress…[p. 32]

Things do not seem to be looking up much, do they?  Can’t wait for…

…the technical baseline review (TBR) that was launched by the new director of the JSF Program Office, Vice Adm. Dave Venlet. He succeeded Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, who was dismissed and has since retired. The TBR supports a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review of the program that is due on Nov. 22 [emphasis added]…

Predate: More broadly on operational requirements, starting with the Chief of the Air Staff:

Canada and the F-35: Two views…

Mark
Ottawa

From a recent post:

Afstan: I’ll bet you didn’t know…

…about this American military contract for helicopter services to a Canadian company…

So Canadian civilians will be helping the US military–and probably the Afghan Air Corps–chopper effort after the government pulls out most of the CF. Nice. And nastily ironic given that the government refuses to keep our Air Wing, or part of it, at Kandahar.  The Americans for their part have noticed our Air Force’s coming departure. From the Update at this post yesterday:

…
Filling the hole left by departing Canadian Forces was “a great concern,” [Brig.-Gen. Fred] Hodges said. “It is not just the battle group, with a squadron of tanks, but all the enablers. They are a big chunk of our aviation. They have some of the best ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) collection capabilities…

Now more from Andrew Potter, recently back from Afstan, at his Maclean’s blog:

Afghanistan: Sorry about the mess…

…The surge was only completed in early September, the crucial operations in Kandahar have only been underway for about six weeks, and it simply is not clear yet how things are going to turn out. There are plenty of negative signs, a few positive signs, and it won’t be clear which way the wind is really blowing until the “fighting season” resumes in early spring. Which is why Canada’s decision to cease combat operations next July 1 is increasingly turning into a big headache for our allies.

In private, American and British military officers have never hidden their disdain for the way Canada is handling this pullout. In February, a British general I was speaking with in Kabul called it “bad campaign work, and bad coalition work”…

This is not to say that Canada’s combat commitment to Afghanistan should be permanent…

…maybe that mission is impossible. But it is the way we are leaving that is making our NATO allies and our Afghan friends extremely unhappy. As [Afghan] ambassador Ludin noted in his opening remarks at the panel last week (repeating a plea he made back in March) despite frequent promises to do so, the Canadian government has given no indication of what form our engagement in the country will take after we cease combat operations. The military people are desperate for trainers [emphasis added, more here], Ludin says his country is desperate for our expertise on governance, but the message we’ve been giving is that we’re leaving, but we’re staying, but we’re not sure how.

This didn’t come up as one of the purported reasons for why Canada didn’t win a seat on the security council at the UN. But given the ignoble way we’re skulking out of one of the UN’s biggest security and development operations in decades [more here], it is mystifying why we ever thought we deserved the seat.

On the other hand one could just not give a damn, my dears–at least about that seat.  But it truly is crass and callous for this government basically to be giving up on the Afghans.

Plus the regular Conference of Defence Associations’ media round-up:

The Future in Southern Afghanistan…
…
On his blog, Matthew Fisher points out that Canadian casualties in Kandahar have fallen nearly 80 percent, and the region is becoming increasingly safe and pacified [do read the whole piece, one excerpt: "...you'd never know about this sea change from reading and hearing the usual doom and gloom about Afghanistan that passes for informed commentary in much of the Canadian media.].
http://communities.canada.com/shareit/blogs/canada-at-war/archive/2010/11/03/…

Update: The Bundeswehr is now getting seriously into the action:

Blitzkrieg in Kunduz
…
Photo: Bundeswehr/Von Söhnen
…

Mark
Ottawa

Further to the Update at this post,

Canada and the F-35: Two views/Reality Update

Bill Sweetman writes about some implications of the latest news at Defense Technology’s “Ares” blog:

Defense Secretary Bob Gates will be told in a meeting today that development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be further delayed, on top of the 13-month slippage that was disclosed in March.

According to Pentagon critic Winslow Wheeler, corroborated by Bloomberg and the New York Times, the USAF/international F-35A and Navy F-35C will be delayed another 12 months and the Marine’s F-35B – still suspended from powered-lift flight and reeling from last months’ bail-out by the UK – will be two to three years late. It’s not clear whether that refers to the completion of development testing or to the initial operational capability (IOC) date.

The operations and support costs for the F-35 will be re-budgeted as 1.5 times [emphasis added] the aircraft it replaces, more than twice what was originally hoped for and 50 percent more than the most recent projections…

The delays are almost certain to affect the ramp-up of production. As with the delay announced earlier this year, the added R&D costs are likely to be paid for by cutting US low-rate initial production (LRIP) orders, increasing the prices of those aircraft. Combined with delays in IOC dates, this will accelerate the pace at which international partners are moving their deliveries to the right…

Customers will also have to figure out how many aircraft they can afford to operate, with basically flat budgets suggesting that total force requirements will have to be reduced by one-third. This will put at risk the 200-plus annual production rates on which the program’s projections of low average procurement unit costs have been based. For the USAF, this could mean other extra costs to extend the life of older fighters…

Meanwhile our government says that Canadian companies will be able to bid for contracts on a total production run of up to 5,000 planes, that we will pay a direct acquisition price of just $70-75 million for each for our 65 fighters, and that long-term maintenance/support costs will be some $7 billion.  It don’t figure, folks.

Predate: More from Mr Sweetman:

Uh-O Canada
…
[Assistant national defence deputy minister Dan] Ross’ statement includes some other remarkable claims.

There are only two ways to buy a Joint Strike Fighter:  by exercising your options as a partner under the Memorandum of Understanding or through the United States Foreign Military Sales program, on a Government-to-Government basis.  The US Government does not participate in RFP competitions. (Emphasis added.)

The last statement would be news in India, Singapore and Korea, to name but three [all three are holding fighter competitions with US aircraft involved, one example]. But Ross isn’t done:

In terms of the JSF MoU it should be made clear that, in order to run a competition, Canada would be forced to withdraw from the MoU.

The full text of the MoU in question is here, and if anyone can find anything in it that support’s Ross’ statement, they can take a cookie from my desk [more on the MoU here].

Mark
Ottawa

After all the prime minister insists the CF will be out of Afstan next year:  From Matthew Fisher of Postmedia News (maybe the Americans are also just trying to put a bit of pressure on us?):

Canada’s PRT in Afghanistan ‘wildly successful’: U.S. diplomat

KANDAHAR CITY, Afghanistan — Canada has come closer to working out an effective relationship between soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan than any other country in the world, according to a U.S. diplomat.

Bill Harris, the top U.S. diplomat in southern Afghanistan, believes that “people will write dissertations” one day about a Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team he describes as a “wildly successful … irregular warfare unit.”..

Canada’s so-called whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan been concentrated on the PRT since Paul Martin’s Liberal government ordered Canadian troops south — away from Kabul — in late 2005. But the activities of the diplomats and other civilians assigned to the PRT have since received far less media attention than the exploits of the battle group.

Nevertheless, the PRT has made a name for itself with its American co-workers, who are the civilian part of a surge ordered by U.S. President Barack Obama.

While there were only four American PRT members on the ground last Christmas, there are now nearly 100 integrated into the PRT. The team is expected to become entirely American when Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan ends next July [emphasis added]…

Mark
Ottawa

Further to the earlier post, there were in fact two Canadian Hornets, not one. From NORAD:

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. [more here] — Out of an abundance of caution, The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) [CF webpage here] diverted two Canadian CF-18’s from the 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron out of Canadian Forces Base Bagotville, Quebec, to track a civilian aircraft determined to be an aircraft of interest as it flew into and over Canadian airspace. The civilian aircraft was passed to two U.S. F-15’s from the 104th Fighter Wing at Barnes Air National Guard Base, Mass., as it transited into U.S. airspace and to its ultimate destination at JFK airport where it landed without incident. The Canadian and U.S. fighters were under the continuous control of NORAD.

NORAD’s role – in close collaboration with homeland defense, security, and law enforcement partners – is to prevent air attacks against North America, safeguard the sovereign airspaces of the U.S. and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted and unauthorized air activity approaching and operating within these airspaces and provide aerospace and maritime warning for North America.

NORAD is the bi-national Canadian and American command that is responsible for the air defense of North America and maritime warning. The command has three subordinate regional headquarters: the Alaskan NORAD Region at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; the Canadian NORAD Region at Winnipeg, Manitoba; and the Continental NORAD Region at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. The command is poised both tactically and strategically in our nation’s capital to provide a multilayered defense to detect, deter and prevent potential threats flying over the airspace of the United States and Canada.

Great circle route map (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):

Mark
Ottawa